Religion & Ritual: Context

Despite being a socialist country, the Vietnamese state recognizes twelve religions: Buddhism (Mahayana & Theravada), Catholicism, Protestantism, Islam, Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, Baha’i, Mennonite, Confucianism, Daoism, animism and spirit cults, and ancestor worship. Buddhism and Catholicism are the two largest world religions practiced in Vietnam, however they are not necessarily the religions practiced by the majority of the Vietnamese people. Kristin Pelzer states, “The core religion of most Vietnamese, from villagers to government officials, is the veneration of ancestors—family, village, local, and national.”[1] Pelzer argues that the majority of Vietnamese, including party officials, venerate their personal (family) and collective (national) ancestors through ceremonies performed in communal halls, temples, and at family altars. Ancestor worship was one of the few religious and ritual practices that the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) remained ambivalent about, as we shall see later on, whereas the CPV set out certain regulations for other religious belief systems.

 

In 1946, the first constitution of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) presented freedom of religion (tu do tin nguong) as a fundamental right for all Vietnamese. While such an attitude appears liberal, the reality was the state created a much more restrictive atmosphere regarding religious and ritual activities. The most important concern of the state was that religious organizations could provide fertile breeding grounds for anti-state activity. Beginning in the mid-1950s, aggressive state policies were implemented in an attempt to control religious life and eliminate superstitions throughout the northern region. This was possible through the creation of standardized administrative structures throughout northern Vietnam in which members of the Communist Party played a large role in monitoring and controlling society, including the disbanding of certain social organizations.

 

While socialist thought rejects the belief in the existence of a divine or supernatural entity (-ies) and officially the government opposed religion, Vietnamese officials were concerned with the social consequences of enforcing such a policy. What evolved from this tension between societal beliefs and official policy was the acceptance of ‘legitimate’ religion but the rejection of superstitions (e.g., fate, geomancy, astrology, divination, and spirit mediumship). However, the government remained ambivalent about one key concept of Vietnamese ritual life—the existence of the souls of ancestors. “Reverence for the dead, particularly officially approved heroes, was an important component in the government’s efforts to legitimize its rule, thus the state never asserted that ancestral souls did not exist.”[2] While the line between legitimate religious belief and superstitions was not clearly defined, the state was clear about its right to set and/or amend the definition as necessary.

 

Aside from disbanding religious and ritual organizations and replacing them with government sanctioned cultural organizations, the state also asserted control over religion and ritual by appropriating land and buildings associated with such practices. The government focused primarily on either confiscating or destroying places associated with ‘superstitious’ ritual practices (e.g., spirit shrines) and the former elite and politically influential local lineages (e.g., village communal halls and lineage halls), whereas places associated with ‘legitimate’ religious practices (e.g., churches and Buddhist temples) were typically left untouched.[3] By the early 1960s the government had succeeded in bringing all aspects of religious and ritual life under their control.

 

Alongside campaigns to rein in religion and ritual, the government sought to reform life-cycle rituals performed by families. Such life-cycle rituals are performed for weddings, funerals, and death anniversaries. “Although each of these individual rites had its own specific characteristics, they shared the common features of ritual engagement with family ancestors, the conduct of a feast, and the participation of friends, kin, and others.”[4] The revolutionary government objected to several aspects of these rites because they contributed to excess waste of staple foods such as rice and productive working hours were lost due to the timing of many of these rites. Other elements of these rites were regarded as superstitious (e.g., astrological auspicious dates, burning votive paper objects) or feudal (e.g., daughters lying on the ground to delay funeral processions). The government reforms sought to shorten the rites to one day only, preferably to be held at night; smaller feasts; all feudal elements were purged and the rites were to be egalitarian; all elements of the supernatural were to be eliminated. Another means of controlling and/or reforming life-cycle rites was by inserting government officials into the rites themselves; local officials would assume critical roles in weddings and funerals. Malarney states, “The insertion of local officials into these rites, and particularly their assumption of control over the speeches, played a critical role in the realization of the government’s agenda to transform the rites into vehicles for official propaganda.”[5]

 

The new revolutionary policies toward religion and ritual changed the cultural landscape in northern Vietnam. As the implementation of these revolutionary policies occurred in the north prior to reunification, the southern areas of Vietnam were not affected until much later. However, as Malarney points out, despite this new level of control by the government there were numerous people throughout the country that still resisted the new policies—the state continuously competed with this popular resistance. Many families were creative in their means of resistance—wedding ceremonies did become shorter, simpler, and more egalitarian, however families insisted on “maintaining the propitiation of family ancestors in their rites in order to demonstrate their continued devotion to the ancestors.”[6] Items such as paper votives for burning at funerary rites were outlawed and for the most part disappeared from public life, however secret production and trade within people’s homes allowed usage to continue.

 

Following reunification in 1975, the government began to implement many of the same cultural reforms in the southern regions of Vietnam. The government was fairly severe in their treatment of religious groups that had opposed the Communists prior—Cao Dai and Hoa Hao being two in particular. Sacred and secular sites under the control of either the Cao Dai or Hoa Hao were seized by the state and many leaders were arrested and placed in detention. One major difference between the implementation of reforms in the north and south was that the government proceeded more slowly and cautiously in the south than had been done in the north. In the south, not only were people resisting religious and ritual reforms but also the establishment of cooperatives—the government was up against a great deal more of resistance on several fronts for them to proceed more rapidly.

 

In December 1986 the Sixth Party Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam was held in which the government adopted a general policy of renewal or “renovation” (doi moi). Economically, this meant a move away from a centrally planned economy towards a market-oriented model. Socially, this meant a loosening of state controls on religious and ritual practices. While the state would continue to release directives and regulations periodically, “coercion by local officials largely disappeared and a level of freedom to organize rites and conduct religious activities appeared that was previously absent. In this more favorable political climate a resurgence of ritual practice began that continues to this day.”[7] Malarney categorizes this resurgence in two stages, (1) families began organizing large-scale weddings, funerals, and death anniversary ceremonies again and (2) ‘superstitious’ and magical practices re-emerged as local groups began practicing public rites at sacred sites again.

 

One point that Malarney makes clear is that while the state has relaxed some restrictions on religious and ritual practices, the government has continued to maintain control over the institutional life of organized religions.[8] This is done through the creation of the Office of Religious Affairs, the Fatherland Front, the Buddhist Association of Vietnam, and the Catholic Patriotic Association—all of which are under either state-sponsored or under the control of the CPV. There are a number of ways in which the state has asserted control over these organizations, including government censorship and control over the printing of religious literature, restrictions on the number of seminaries or training schools and the number of students studying in them, the registration of all religious groups, and so on. Through the number of restrictions on these groups it becomes clear that the state still finds organized religion a threat to state power.

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[1] Kristin Pelzer, “On Defining ‘Vietnamese Religion’: Reflections on Bruce Matthews’ Article” Buddhist-Christian Studies 12 (1992): 75-79.

[2] Shaun Kingsley Malarney, “Return to the Past? Dynamics of Contemporary Religious and Ritual Transformations,” in Postwar Vietnam: Dynamics of a Transforming Society, Hy Van Luong, ed., pp. 225-256, Singapore: ISEAS; Landham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003, p. 227.

[3] Ibid, 228.

[4] Shaun Kingsley Malarney, “Return to the Past?”, 229.

[5] Ibid, 230.

[6] Ibid, 231.

[7] Ibid, 235.

[8] Ibid, 248.

Religion & Ritual: Text

As mentioned earlier, by the early 1960s the government for the most part had succeeded in bringing all aspects of religious and ritual life under their control. However, as Malarney points out, “while many people were willing to implement reforms that made rites simpler or more egalitarian, they were unwilling to allow the state and its officials to dictate how they and their families should conduct important family rituals.”[1] We see various acts of resistance during this period, including the continued existence of informal Buddhist associations despite the government’s attempts at disbanding or co-opting them. During the pre-revolutionary period in northern Vietnam, many communities were host to lay Buddhist groups primarily composed of older women (hoi chub a). “These groups usually met at temples to chant and conduct rites, although in many communities they also assembled at people’s homes to chant during funeral rites.”[2] As these lay groups were non-state sanctioned social organizations, by the mid-1950s many of these groups ended their public activities and became private organizations that met clandestinely in people’s homes to perform these rites.

What is particularly interesting about these groups is that the membership usually comprised female relatives of local officials. These officials were oftentimes reluctant to publicly criticize or interfere with the women’s activities, particularly if the relations were elders. Malarney points out two possible reasons for such acquiescence: officials did not want to cross their female kin and they recognized the critical importance of funeral rites for families, “and they held that it was better to allow people to conduct their rites as the felt most comfortable, provided of course that it remained in the privacy of their homes.”[3] This dichotomy between state rhetoric and societal practices represents the inability for the state to formally and completely impose their will on the people—an unspoken dialogue emerged between the state and people about what would be tolerated and what would not.

Since 1986 Vietnam has seen a resurgence of religious and ritual activity. This has occurred because following doi moi (“renovation”) the central government began to relax their control over cultural affairs. What has become evident is that these cultural and ritual activities are not identical to pre-revolutionary practices, but rather a blending of pre-revolutionary practices with those practices that were encouraged during reform campaigns beginning in the 1950s for northern Vietnam and after 1975 in southern Vietnam.[4] What became clear following the resurgence of life-cycle rituals was that women, particularly elderly women, were the defenders and keepers of these traditions. As was discussed above, women were the foci of resistance during the 1950s until renovation and when the public atmosphere became more welcoming, it was these same women that made the push to bring about changes.

Female religious groups began to take on very public roles, such as chanting at funerals, and increasingly pushed the boundaries of what was acceptable by the state—causing the state to increase the kinds and numbers of activities that would be tolerated. Malarney identified two reasons why women were able to play such an active role in the re-appropriation of religion and rituals by the people: (1) “many women had not renounced their religious practices during the reform years, thus when new possibilities emerged, they were able to bring out publicly that which they had privately retained for years” and (2) because CPV membership was male dominated, many women did not have the same political liabilities as men.[5] If a male party member openly advocated unsanctioned religious or ritual practice they could be censured or lose opportunities for political advancement, whereas women typically were not as involved and therefore the party had few effective sanctions that could be applied.

Changes that were encouraged during the revolutionary campaigns that have remained following renovation include, the adoption of Western-style dress for wedding ceremonies; many of the ceremonies have retained an egalitarian character; and the virtual disappearance of arranged marriages, underage marriages, and polygamy. Other changes that have occurred since renovation include the increasing size and expense of feasts—as incomes and conspicuous consumption have increased so have the sizes of celebratory feasts, to the point where guests can be expected to contribute financially to the feast.

Another important change in life-cycle rituals since 1986 are the rites dedicated to the war dead. Hundreds of thousands of soldiers were killed during the wars against France, the U.S., China, and Cambodia—man of those bodies were either lost or buried on the front lines and never returned home. In the late 1940s, the DRV established different programs to honor those that died serving their country, including family assistance, commemorative monuments, special cemeteries, and the National War Veterans and Invalids Day. While the efforts of the state are appreciated by the population, family members of the deceased have created their own private commemorative rites and have gone to such measures as attempting to locate the remains and bring them home for final funeral rites. It should be noted only those that fought for the Communists are officially recognized by the state for commemoration while those who fought against the Communists are not recognized by the state and those rites must be performed in private.

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[1] Shaun Kingsley Malarney, “Return to the Past? Dynamics of Contemporary Religious and Ritual Transformations,” in Postwar Vietnam: Dynamics of a Transforming Society, Hy Van Luong, ed., pp. 225-256, Singapore: ISEAS; Landham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003, p. 232.

[2] Ibid, 232.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Shaun Kingsley Malarney, Culture, Ritual and Revolution in Vietnam, London; New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002, p. 2.

[5] Shaun Kingsley Malarney, “Return to the Past? Dynamics of Contemporary Religious and Ritual Transformations,” in Postwar Vietnam: Dynamics of a Transforming Society, Hy Van Luong, ed., pp. 225-256, Singapore: ISEAS; Landham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003, p. 235.

Religion & Ritual: Subtext

Ronald J. Cima, ed. Vietnam: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1987. http://countrystudies.us/vietnam/

The Country Studies website provides online versions of books published by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress under the Country Studies/Area Handbook Program sponsored by the U.S. Department of Army. The Vietnam country study is broken into several sections, including history, the society and its environment, the economy, the government, and a bibliography. The section on religion provides a nice overview of religion in Vietnam and is from a trust, reputable source. It gives a general introduction to religions practiced in Vietnam and their relationship with the Communist State. Good for general information.

 

Laura Clark and Suzanne Brown. “Buddhism in Vietnam.” Asian Studies Department, Pacific University. http://mcel.pacificu.edu/as/students/vb/

This website is geared towards teachers of secondary and post secondary students to use as resource when teaching about world religions. A good deal of the information is pretty basic and about Buddhism in general, however, there are a few links specifically about the practice of Buddhism in Vietnam. Included on this page are several links for information about Buddhism during and after the American War and an annotated bibliography. 

 

Karen Fjelstad and Nguyen Thi Hien, ed. Possessed by the Spirits: Mediumship in Contemporary Vietnamese Communities. Ithaca, NY: SEA Program Publications, Cornell University, 2006.

As can be evidenced by the number of studies being published lately, popular ritual is experiencing a great revival in contemporary Vietnamese society. This edited volume contains multi-disciplinary articles that focus on the revitalization of spirit possession rituals (len dong)—the most popular rituals in Vietnam. Spirit possession rituals are associated with the Mother Goddess religion (Dao Mau), which is considered one of the oldest religious traditions in Vietnam. The articles in this book can be divided into two approaches—the first looks at the individual experience of how and why people become spirit mediums and the stories and personal histories of those that participate in spirit possession ceremonies; the second views spirit possession as a socio-cultural phenomenon by looking at the history of Dao Mau, the rituals themselves, regional variations, etc. Also, several essays examine how len dong as a ritual was able to survive, as practitioners were often arrested and harassed by government officials, and how it continues to thrive, considering the practice is still not officially allowed.

 

Daniel Goodkind. “State Agendas, Local Sentiments: Vietnamese Wedding Practices Amidst Socialist Transformations.” Social Forces 75, no. 2 (December 1996): 717-742.

This article examines the state’s attempts to simplify and devalue marriage practices in Vietnam through a field survey of a northern and a southern province in 1993. As socialist transformations in Vietnam appear to parallel those that occurred in China, the question Goodkind seeks to answer is whether Vietnam’s socialist reforms have left a lasting impact on Vietnamese society as appears to have occurred in China. Following China’s post-Mao free market reforms, a resurgence of wedding practices that had previously been discouraged was seen—and yet certain other practices have not been revived. Goodkind seeks to apply this model to Vietnam in order to gauge the efficacy of Vietnam’s socialist reforms. The author concludes that the ‘socialist marriage pattern’ gained a foothold in the northern province only, mostly due to the fact that attempts to transform societal and cultural practices first began in the North in the 1940s and 1950s, whereas these reforms were not replicated in the South until after reunification in 1975.

 

Hy V. Luong. Revolution in the Village: Tradition and Transformation in North Vietnam, 1925-1988. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1992.

In this study Hy V. Luong examines the revolutionary processes in the village of Son-Duong in the Red River Delta from the 1930s until the 1990s (from the colonial to the socialist era) through oral histories taken during field research and archival research in France and North Vietnam. In this case study of Son-Duong, Hy V. Luong addresses issues of how the socialist government affected village ritual life, including agricultural, death anniversaries, funerals, weddings, etc. She also examines the various village associations that existed prior and those that were later phased out by the new government.

 

Ann Marie Leshkowich. “Woman, Buddhist, Entrepreneur: Gender, Moral Values, and Class Anxiety in Late Socialist Vietnam.” Journal of Vietnamese Studies 1, nos. 1-2 (February/August 2006): 277-313.

While doing fieldwork in Ho Chi Minh City with female cloth and clothing traders, the author had the opportunity to interview a woman (Hien) who was the president and co-owner with her husband of a garment factory outside of HCMC. Leshkowich sought to explore how political connections, gendered subjectivities, and economic strategies might differ for women who developed small- to medium-scale businesses compared with women who developed large-scale businesses. From her interview with Hien, a self-proclaimed devout Buddhist, the following questions surfaced: “Why did Buddhism appeal to her [Hien] as an entrepreneurial ethic? How did her claims relate to broader discussions of entrepreneurship and moral values in Vietnam and throughout the region? What role did gender play in Hien’s embrace of Buddhism? What does her performance of piety reveal about the tensions surrounding late socialist, economic transformation and class stratification?”[1] The author concludes that Hien’s position as a pious Buddhist/successful female entrepreneur parallels the goal of the nation, in that market-oriented development is encouraged, however the state does not want accrued wealth to challenge its position as the political and moral authority of Vietnamese culture. Also, through Buddhism Hien is able to protect herself as female entrepreneur in that it creates a socially acceptable space for women to interact (and be successful) with a male-dominated business world.

 

Philip Taylor. Goddess on the Rise: Pilgrimage and Popular Religion in Vietnam. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2004.

Taylor is a Professor of Anthropology at the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University. Goddess on the Rise is an ethnography about pilgrimages and popular religion in Vietnam—particularly the most popular pilgrimage site in Vietnam, the Lady of the Realm (Bà Chúa Xứ), which is located on Sam Mountain near the Vietnam-Cambodia border. The Lady of the Realm is considered a local protector deity and legends affiliate her with key events in local history. Taylor’s study of the Lady of the Realm is representative of the growth in goddess worship in Vietnam—a number of interpretations, identities, histories, and symbols become associated with various deities and all of these differing attitudes co-exist without conflict (including official state definitions). Taylor points out that pilgrimage sites and other places of religious worship and ritual pose questions related to religious freedom and state control in Vietnam. Is the Party losing relevance in contemporary society? Do such practices reflect a general increase in wealth and consumption in Vietnamese society? Can popular religion be read as cultural nationalism during a time of increased globalization inundation of western values?

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[1] Ann Marie Leshkowich, “Woman, Buddhist, Entrepreneur,” 278.

Population Movements: Context

Migration has long played a role in the history of Vietnam and in particular is a key factor in the development of the state and society during the mid- to late-20^th century. After 1954 the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) wanted to exert close control over population mobility in the north; to do so the government promoted migration to the rural and highland areas and restricted movement to the cities. During reunification in 1975, these policies were implemented throughout the nation. However, due to socioeconomic policies associated with reunification the government’s control over mobility failed. One of the major causes of this loss of control was free migration—the unrestricted ability to move around the country, which had not been experienced since before French colonization. While the state still maintained some control over movement, it was not to the same extent as had been exerted by the French or even by the pre-1975 DRV government. Following this influx of uncontrolled free migration, the government was forced to accept this new situation, which ultimately led to doi moi (Renovation) whereby existing patterns of internal and external migration were recognized as were the loosening of economic and social controls.

Population movements in Vietnam cannot all be characterized by the desire to escape communist rule, as there are different kinds of migrations as well as different reasons for migrating. Some of the different types of migration include, forced, state-sponsored, sojourners or temporary, and spontaneous or free. Reasons for migrating include searching for work or viable land to better one’s life, fear of reprisal from officials, settling land for internal and external security, or just the desire to see what is outside of the village or on the other side of the river. Also, a trend that is being seen lately is the return of migrants to their places of origins from the central highlands or new economic zones due to failed ventures, desire for change, to escape debt, or various other reasons.

Following the Geneva Agreement, the French handed over the city of Hanoi to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on 10 October 1954. As a result about one million people moved from the north to the south whereas Viet Minh loyalists moved into Hanoi and other areas in the north. Shortly thereafter the DRV created policies that addressed the mobility of the population, including the institution of household registration (ho khau) which was based on a Chinese model aimed at restricting urban expansion by controlling how many people and who moved into the cities from the countryside. The ho khau system was eventually introduced into the countryside and “local surveillance networks were established to ensure that every citizen lived and slept in their place of registered residence.”[1] Along with the ho khau system, a coupon rationing system was introduced which also limited any sort of free migration because in order to partake in the rationing system, which restricted the supply of basic commodity goods, one needed to be registered with the local authorities. At this point in time, working for the state (either in production or administration) was one of the only ways in which migration into the cities could occur. The introduction of collectivization in 1958 also limited mobility because “membership in the cooperative determined access to economic and social benefits.”[2] In order to obtain membership, household registration was required. Without said membership people could not work on the paddies, could not trade, and could not work for wages.

Such restrictions did not abolish spontaneous migration; it just made it very expensive. There were state-approved migration programs which included moving from urban to rural or from lowland to highland. Between 1961 and 1966 over one million people participated in these state migration programs—moving into national agricultural and forestry enterprises or to new economic zone cooperatives in the highlands. Following reunification in 1975 the state sought to implement the same strategies to the entire nation. There were three objectives to the state’s post-reunification migration policy: (1) reduce the population density in the Red River Delta and coastal plains of central Vietnam; (2) limit population growth in urban areas, especially in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City; and (3) to distribute labor for productive development and to establish populations in regions that would serve the interests of internal and external security (highlands, border areas).

The DRV sought to reduce the population in the Red River Delta and coastal plains of central Vietnam by relocating lowlanders into the highlands in order to improve the population’s welfare and develop the economy. The logic was that “the plains would supply population to the highlands, and resources produced in both regions would feed the state’s industrialization policy.”[3] Part of the state’s vision with population redistribution was to not only improve individual situations but to improve whole nation’s situation. Le Duan, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam, was insistent that the protection of the country (internal and external) must grow together with the economy—this combination was evident in policies directed at the cities.

Following reunification the de-urbanization of the south was a major concern of the government for three reasons: (1) the withdrawal of US support meant that cities could no longer support large populations; (2) the urban middle class posed a threat to the state; and (3) cities were symbolic of capitalism and inequality. “Authorities imposed socialism on an urban population far less malleable—and perceived as such—than that of Hanoi twenty years ago. This model and the manner of its implementation was to provoke a further exodus—of the boat people.”[4]

With regard to security, migration policy served to enhance both internal and external security in the highlands and along border areas. By establishing Kinh (ethnic Vietnamese) communities a ‘tense region’ could be brought under the control of the central government as the state had faced a major ethnic insurgency in the Central Highlands in 1975. External or national defense was necessary as China’s relationship with Vietnam waned and the relationship between Cambodia and China grew. In 1978 100,000 people settled along the border with China to ensure national security. Alongside Kinh resettlement in the highlands, a program of sedentarization of the ethnic minorities was implemented as well. “Initiated in the north in 1968, sedentarization aimed to stop highlanders’ perceived destruction of the forest, to teach them up-to-date farming practices, and to ‘rationalise settlement patterns’ in line with the state’s desire to improve the governance and security of the highlands.”[5]

As mentioned earlier, in April 1975 the Vietnamese were allowed to move freely throughout the country. There were still some restrictions, such as transportation and permission had to be obtained but the ability to move freely between regions and provinces had not been experienced since before French colonial rule. Due to reunification and the freedom of movement families were reunited and informal commercial ties were established resulting in an explosion of consumption in the north and flows of goods into the south. A new socioeconomic reality emerged that was in direct contrast to the socialist vision—the development of a two-tier economy (fixed-price system organized by the state and capitalist system operating according to the laws of supply and demand). Prior to reunification there had always existed a black market, however after reunification the conditions of the market began to grow exponentially.

At the Sixth Party Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party in 1986 the need for renovation (doi moi) was expressed due to the fact that the vision of a socialist utopia did not materialize and the people no longer supported such a vision. The implementation of doi moi allowed for the free movement of people throughout the country, more so than what was seen after reunification. Factors involved with this new movement include the decollectivization of land, which opened up the countryside “to diverse production relationships rather than just the state-endorsed collective approach, and labourers [did] not have to be tied to the land any more.”[6] Also the decentralization of power and the abolition of the subsidy system allowed for the free flow of labor and reduction of the state’s power to control people’s movements. Another large factor was the development of a private sector that created a space for private transportation companies—the means with which to travel were made readily available (and legal).

Also during doi moi spontaneous migration began to occur by the mid-1990s to the Central Highlands, which eventually integrated the Highlands into the economy of the whole country. Migrants were attracted to the NEZs, without government influence, due to the development of a commodity market—particularly coffee. Eventually these spontaneous migrations replaced the planned migration as the vehicle of population redistribution. Unfortunately the ability to bypass state structures and the resulting loss of administrative control of migration begat negative impacts—social evils (gambling, drugs, theft), difficulty of administration, malaria, and loss of forest and biodiversity due to clear-cutting of forests.

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[1] Andrew Hardy, “State Visions, Migrant Decisions: Population Movements since the End of the Vietnam War,” In Postwar Vietnam: Dynamics of a Transforming Society, edited by Hy Van Luong, 107-138, Singapore: ISEAS; Landham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003; p. 109.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid, 110.

[4] Ibid, 111.

[5] Ibid, 114.

[6] Li Tana, Peasants on the Move, 4.

Population Movements: Text

In “State Visions, Migrant Decisions: Population Movements since the End of the Vietnam War” Andrew Hardy aims to measure the effectiveness of the state’s socialist vision (economic and governance) by looking at the mobility of the Vietnamese. Following reunification in 1975 people could move freely throughout the country again—granted there were some restrictions but comparatively speaking this freedom of movement was unheard of since colonization by the French. Also in 1975 the state implemented their vision of social construction in the south—an idea that was fairly foreign to the liberal economy of the south. Such policies included the de-urbanization of ‘migrant-swollen cities’ and transforming urbanites from consumers into producers. Socialist economic policies that were implemented included a new currency, taxation and reform of capitalism, nationalization of industry and agricultural collectivization.

The quick dismantlement of the capitalist economy in the south resulted in the marginalization of large sections of the population thus forcing many out of the cities and into the New Economic Zones (NEZs) in rural Vietnam. Many of the NEZs were located along the Cambodian border and were subject to periodic attacks by the Khmer Rouge. Ironically the marginalization, poor conditions, ineffective management, and household registration experienced in the NEZs caused many migrants to return and subsequently emigrate out of Vietnam, typically by boat. Studies have found that the majority of boat people were ethnic Chinese from southern Vietnam. Hardy argues that the “refugee phenomenon cannot be understood as a simple failure of diplomacy. Nor was it even the expression of two competing Vietnamese nationalisms in migration decisions by some on the defeated side.”[1] These factors were important in the late 1970s but the flow of refugees continued into the 1980s and included people from the north.

By analyzing refugee interviews in countries of first asylum Hardy attempts to understand the circumstances that caused an outflow of refugees during the 1980s from various regions on the country. One part of this answer was provided by the Vietnamese Immigration Department, many people left in order to be reunited with family, some were enemies of the revolution, some needed to escape debt, others could not deal with this new society. "By the 1980s, boarding a boat was no longer a response to specific fears or experiences of exclusion from Vietnam’s new society. For many, it constituted an act of resistance to the government’s vision for the future, a radical frustration with the “shortcomings” of a system unable to provide for its people’s basic needs, a rejection of the “difficulties” the government expected people to endure for a cause in which they no longer believed."[2] Countries of first asylum began to realize many of these refugees were no longer fleeing from communism or perceived threats on their lives but searching for new opportunities—these refugees were labeled ‘economic migrants’ and were separated from ‘genuine refugees’.

Hardy found that economic hardship was not the only explanation for out-migration. “Family situations, petty conflicts, frustrated hopes, boredom, and minor difficulties with the authorities were also of great importance.”[3] Some people became accidental refugees, such as one man visiting relatives in Laos who became curious about what things would look like on the other side of the Mekong River. Crossing over into Thailand he was arrested by local police and repatriated to Vietnam.

Hardy states that during the 1980s the people failed to uphold the state’s vision of a socialist utopian society—many became disillusioned and lost confidence with the government. The idea of a socialist paradise on earth helps people to accept supposed short-term hardships in the present—before 1975 the idea of peace represented a sort of paradise and hardships were endured for the end goal. However, once the war ended and people began to experience years of even greater hardship, many became disillusioned and sought a new paradise available through emigration. It was not until the end of socialist construction and the gains experienced under doi moi that the boat people phenomenon stopped. By the late 1990s many emigrants actually returned to Vietnam.

Lastly Hardy discusses the gendered aspects of migration in Vietnam. Temporary or seasonal migration is experienced by many families in which the male breadwinner will leave the village for cities or the highlands while the women remain behind and tend the fields. During the harvest the men will return and assist the women, only to leave again once the harvest is complete. Such temporary work includes logging, driving xe om (motorbike taxi) or xyclo (bicycle rickshaw), construction, carpentry, and general labor—very seldom will one find a contract securing employment. Young women migrants seeking employment have more limited choices—o xin (maids) or working in karaoke and massage parlors or brothels. “Many of them remit money to their families, and some hope, after a few years in the city, to go home with enough money to set up as traders. A number, however, aim to escape their mothers’ lives in the paddy fields by settling away from home.”[4] This reflects Vietnamese society in that men are able to leave for economic reasons, however as choices for young women are limited they are either forced to remain in the village and work a hard life or move to the city and still have a hard life.

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[1] Andrew Hardy, “State Visions, Migrant Decisions: Population Movements since the End of the Vietnam War,” in Postwar Vietnam: Dynamics of a Transforming Society, edited by Hy Van Luong, 107-138, Singapore: ISEAS; Landham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003, p. 118.

[2] Ibid, 119.

[3] Ibid, 120.

[4] Ibid, 129.

Population Movements: Subtext

Anh Dang, Sidney Goldstein, and James McNally. “Internal Migration and Development in Vietnam.” The International Migration Review 31, no. 2 (Summer 1997): 312-337.

This article attempts to understand the nature of the relationship between population movement and development as Vietnam moves further away from the command economy through increased market reforms. The focus of this particular study is on migration as a response to uneven development and policy intervention and not on the consequences of migration for the purposes of national development and policy measures. The authors have identified three macro-structural changes related to the labor market that have had unintended effects on population movements in Vietnam. They are decollectivization, in which collective land was reallocated to individual families; the elimination of the subsidy system, where the government is no longer responsible for subsidies and rationing and limits on the acquisition of essential goods and residence have been lifted; and restrictions on trade and transportation in the private sector were removed. The results of their analysis on the 1989 census show that more developed provinces attract more immigrants while less developed provinces produce more outmigrants. Of those migrating, most moved to urban and industrialized areas regardless of the levels of development in the home province. These results reinforce the standard that development effects migration patterns but also proves that despite government resettlement programs, areas in which outmigration was encouraged (urban) still received large amounts of immigrants.

 

Jacqueline Desbarats. “Population Redistribution in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.” Population and Development Review 13, no. 1 (March 1987): 43-76.

Published shortly after the implementation of doi moi in 1986, Desbarats provides an analysis of population movements (both rural-urban and urban-rural) in post-1975 Vietnam, which includes a description of the government’s population redistribution policies and an evaluation of the demographic, geographic and economic effects of these policies. Government policies for population redistribution sought to address four types of needs: economic, demographic, internal security, and external security. Economically and demographically speaking the government needed to increase agricultural output so as to avoid the high cost of transporting foods around the country—this included redistributing the labor force from densely populated areas to underpopulated areas with arable land for wet-rice agriculture. With regard to security issues, the government needed to reduce the urban population—particularly in the southern cities as potentially disruptive elements lived in the cities (e.g., Catholic refugees, former RVN military and police forces). While potential southern dissidents were moved out of southern cities, loyal northern cadres and their families were moved to southern cities and the Central Highlands to help ensure internal security for the Communist government. To ensure external security loyalists were also moved to strategic areas near Vietnam’s borders with China, Laos, and Cambodia. The author concludes that Vietnamese planners viewed cities as a threat to the nation instead of an opportunity for economic development and therefore quickly addressed urban unemployment and rural underpopulation via population redistribution from urban to rural areas. These ideological goals however undermined any effectiveness of the redistribution program because many in the urbanized southern areas resisted forced population transfers causing the government to rely on increased forms of coercion. Increased resistance resulted in agricultural outputs lowers than the expected return, thus showing that the relocation program was unsuccessful. Desbarats also shows that the redistribution program also caused approximately one million refugees to flee Vietnam because of the perceived threat of forced exile to a New Economic Zone. “Thus, the increased social control achieved by the Vietnamese government has been accomplished through international rather than internal migration, and at the cost of great human suffering, a much tarnished international image, and significant damage to the country’s development prospects.”[1]

 

Carl Haub and Phuong Thi Thu Huong. “An Overview of Population and Development in Vietnam.” Population Reference Bureau. http://www.prb.org/Articles/2003/AnOverviewofPopulationDevelopmentinVietnam.aspx

This 2003 report about population and development in Vietnam contains a number of useful statistics and charts/graphs. Information from the 1999 Census shows that the growth rate of Vietnam had declined to its lowest point since reunification in 1975—mostly due to many couples limiting the size of their family to two children. Despite the decline of the growth rate, Vietnam’s population density has been steadily increasing and is now one of the most densely populated countries in Southeast Asia and the world. Results of this study conclude that the migration trends that were found in the 1989 Census are continuing—people are moving from rural to urban areas as well as to the new economic zones.

 

Linda Hitchcox. “Relocation in Vietnam and Outmigration: The Ideological and Economic Context.” In Migration: The Asian Experience, edited by Judith M. Brown and Rosemary Foot, 202-220. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994.

This essay “examines migration in and from Vietnam, exploring the ways in which the phenomenon is constructed by participants and authorities as political ideology, as economic necessity and as a social support system” during the years 1979 and 1994.[2] Hitchcox begins with a brief discussion of the economic and political background of Vietnam during the period prior to her examination in order to situate her study within the contexts of a chaotic wartime atmosphere beginning in 1954. Hitchcox discusses state-sponsored migration through the government population programs first begun in 1975. And also gives significant attention to Nghe Tinh and Thanh Hoa as areas of significant outmigration due to the unfavorable geographic and atmosphere conditions, which often led to either low-yielding or destroyed rice crops. Another area of attention is Quang Ninh, a province that attracted much internal migration because of employment in the coal mines and also outward migration because of its proximity to Hong Kong.

 

Li Tana. Peasants on the Move, Rural-Urban Migration in the Hanoi Region. Singapore: ISEAS, 1996.

This study examines “the main trends, directions and patters of the population movement in the Red River Delta.”[3] Through surveys and interviews with unskilled workers in Hanoi the author seeks to determine the institutional changes that occurred in the countryside since the beginning of doi moi that allowed for voluntary migration from rural areas to urban. Li Tana’s results determined that the economic and political transitions Vietnam is experiencing are fundamentally different from “other Southeast Asian countries where the economic transition has not involved such profound changes and adjustments both by the state and its people.”[4] Patterns of Vietnam’s rural to urban migration that emerged show that the majority of migrants are driven by economic motives (underemployment, low wages); movements are typically temporary and are made predominantly by the family’s breadwinner rather than the movement of the entire family; village links are important and maintained as that is how information on family, employment, and housing is shared. Li Tana concludes that two fundamental factors shape rural to urban migration, “the fact that at present every Vietnamese peasant has a piece of land, and the residential restriction in urban areas.”[5] Due to these factors the above mentioned patterns have developed leading the researcher to conclude that rural to urban migration is both manageable and more than likely necessary for achieving national development goals.

 

Nigel Thrift and Dean Forbes. The Price of War: Urbanization in Vietnam 1954-85. London: Allen & Unwin (Publishers) Ltd., 1986.

This book examines the Vietnamese experience of urbanization under socialism. Thrift and Forbes modify the general model of urbanization under socialism as outlined by Pearse Murray and Ivan Szelenyi (1984), which was intended to apply to urbanization in all socialist countries. Thrift and Forbes argue that urbanization in a socialist state differs from urbanization in a socialist developing country (e.g., Vietnam, Angola, Guyana) and therefore a new set of adjustable parameters must be developed. Thrift and Forbes stress the importance of examining the direct and indirect effects that war has had on both Vietnamese society and Vietnamese urbanization. According to the authors, the nature of Vietnamese civil society has played a strong role in the rates and patterns of urbanization—particularly following key events in Vietnamese history between 1954 and 1985. The data analyzed and subsequent analyses may be dated as this monograph was published two decades ago and since then much information that was not previously available has surfaced, but it does provide a considerable contribution to our knowledge base and provokes ideas for future research.

 

Heather Xiaoquan Zhang, P. Mick Kelly, Catherine Locke, Alexandra Winkels, and W. Neil Adger. “Structure and Implication of Migration in a Transitional Economy: Beyond the Planned and Spontaneous Dichotomy in Vietnam.” CSERGE Working Paper GEC 01-01.

This study is similar to the 1997 study by Anh Dang, Sidney Goldstein, and James McNally (see above) in that it links contemporary migration to development and identifies the major patterns and trends of population mobility beginning with migration under French colonial rule until post-1986 (doi moi). This study comes to the same conclusions, that “despite the state’s continued attempts to reshape the country’s population configuration and distribution over recent historical periods, the policy outcomes with respect to population mobility have been swayed as much by individuals and their families in pursuit of their own aspirations and livelihoods as by the state plans.”[6] This study is particularly interesting and informative due to its in depth examination of Vietnamese population movements beginning with French colonial rule.

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[1] Jacqueline Desbarats, “Population Redistribution in Vietnam,” 73.

[2] Linda Hitchcox, “Relocation in Vietnam and Outmigration,” 202.

[3] Li Tana, Peasants on the Move, 2.

[4] Ibid, 64.

[5] Ibid, 65.

[6] Anh Dang, et al., “Internal Migration and Development in Vietnam,” 3.

Subtext

http://www.nea.gov.vn/english/index.aspx

This is the official cite for the Vietnam Environmental Protection Agency, not to worry, it is also offered in English. This is site offers information on the agency and the improvements it is making in Vietnam. It is very interesting to see the website of an actual agency that are mentioned in my Text portion of the project.

www.grip.ac.jp/module/vietnam/main_en.pdf

This article offers suggestions for how Vietnam can effectively modernize itself and still keep pollution regulated. The states the Vietnam first needs the means and awareness of the problem to be able to do anything further. There is no reason why Vietnam should not be capable of becoming industrialized without the effects pollution is currently having.

www.hhh.se/vietnam/p-health.htm

This report focuses on the effects World War two had on the people and
environment of Vietnam. After fourteen million metric tons of explosives were
dropped on the fragile people and landscape of Vietnam, repairs were needed
desperately. The report focuses on health problems experienced by people, and
the environment, after the war.

http://www.rrcap.unep.org/reports/soe/vietnam/overview/environmental_concerns.htm

An overview of all the environmental problems that are currently plaguing Vietnam. Good summary seemingly every environmental problem that Vietnam is being faced with.

http://www.asiasource.org/asip/nguyen.cfm

This cite also covers various environmental problems in Vietnam, but focuses more on the relationship between the development of Vietnam's economy and the environmental problems it is causing.

Davis, Ben. Black Market: Inside the Endangered Species Trade in Asia.

This book offers a look into the harsh reality that is the black market. It has over 100 photos that document everywhere from illegal trade to the people trying to stop it and lastly the animals that suffer because of this dark Industry. This book touches on illegal snakes that are exported from Vietnam, such as Pythons and it even touches on the Russian mafia that is operating its black market operation in Siberia. If anyone is concerned about animals and the affects this multimillion operation is having in any country in Southeast Asia, this book would be a fascinating read.


http://www.mcdvietnam.org/?page=home

If anyone would like to know more about the coastal clean up efforts that were mentioned in the Context part of the project, this is an excellent website that offers information about what is being done to work with people that make their living on the coast.